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The Illusion of Substance: Why Rapanos v. United States and Its
Resulting Regulatory Guidance Do Not Significantly Limit
Federal Regulation of Wetlands*
In June 2006, the United States Supreme Court delivered a decision
regarding the power of the federal government to regulate wetlands under
the Clean Water Act' ("CWA"). In Rapanos v. United States,2 the Court
purported to clarify two of its previous rulings on the scope of the CWA's
jurisdiction 3-United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.4 and Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers ("SWANCC'). 5 However, the decision did not have its intended
effect because no single opinion commanded the vote of a majority of the
Justices, leaving the lower courts and the agencies in charge of enforcing
the CWA with unclear guidelines for regulating wetlands.6 Five opinions
were announced: a four-Justice plurality, two individual concurrences, and
two dissents. Justice Kennedy's concurrence, which is binding on the
lower courts,7 set out a standard for determining the CWA's jurisdictional
grant over wetlands that requires a case-by-case judicial analysis of
whether the wetland forms a "significant nexus" with a navigable body of
water, since navigable bodies of water are expressly covered by the CWA.8
In response to Rapanos, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
and the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") released Clean Water Act
Jurisdiction Following the U.S. Supreme Court's Opinion in Rapanos v.
United States and Carabell v. United States (2007) ("Guidance"), a

* Copyright © 2008 by Samuel P. Bickett.
1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-387 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
2. 547 U.S. -, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
3. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at -, 126 S. Ct. at 2216-17.

4. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
5. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
6. See, e.g., Michael C. Doff, In the Wetlands Case, the Supreme Court Divides Over the
Clean Water Act-and Seemingly Over How To Read Statutes as Well, FINDLAW LEGAL NEWS &
COMMENT., Apr. 17, 2007, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/doff/20060621.html (claiming that

Rapanos left the lower courts to "muddle through as best they can, until a future case yields
greater clarity"); Charles Lane, Justices Rein In Clean Water Act, WASH. POST, June 20, 2006, at
Al (stating that Rapanos could limit the federal government's enforcement power over the CWA,
but the "set of opinions handed down by the justices did little to define what those limits might
be").
7. For a discussion of why Justice Kennedy's opinion is binding, see infra notes 42-50 and
accompanying text.
8. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at -, 126 S. Ct. at 2236 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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guidance to its regulators to accommodate the changes required by the
opinion.'
This Recent Development will attempt to show that Justice Kennedy's
concurrence and the Guidance mostly affect procedural, not substantive,
requirements that the federal government must follow before exercising
jurisdiction over wetlands and should not be interpreted as significantly
restricting the scope of the CWA's jurisdictional grant. First, it will
attempt to explicate the true holding of Rapanos, concluding that the
Kennedy concurrence's "significant nexus" standard is controlling, but at
the same time, in situations where the plurality's bright-line test would
permit jurisdiction and the significant nexus test would not, courts should
find federal jurisdiction. Then, it will discuss the scope and implications of
the ruling and subsequent Guidance released by the EPA and the Corps,
finding that neither the decision nor the Guidance need to be read to
significantly limit federal jurisdiction over wetlands. Finally, it will
propose two legal theories that the Corps and courts may use to comply
with the Rapanos significant nexus standard yet still maintain broad
jurisdiction over most of the nation's wetlands. The first is to permit a
broad range of chemical, physical, and biological effects to constitute a
significant nexus with a navigable water. The second is to more liberally
use the power granted to the Corps under the CWA to prohibit the addition
of pollutants to navigable waters.
Prior to Rapanos, the controlling Supreme Court decision regarding
the CWA's coverage of wetlands was United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc.10 In Riverside Bayview, the Court held that a wetland directly
abutting a navigable water was within the scope of the CWA because there
is ambiguity in such cases as to where the navigable water ends and the
land begins." The decision in Riverside Bayview was deferential to the
administrative agencies in charge of promulgating and enforcing wetland
regulations regarding the CWA's jurisdictional grant. 2 As a result, the

9. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY & DEP'T OF THE ARMY, CLEAN WATER ACT JURISDICTION
FOLLOWING THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S OPINION IN RAPANOS V. UNITED STATES AND CARABELL

V. UNITED STATES (2007) [hereinafter "GUIDANCE"], available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/
wetlands/pdf/RapanosGuidance6507.pdf.
10. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
II. Id. at 132.
12. Id. at 134 ("[T]he Corps' ecological judgment about the relationship between waters and
their adjacent wetlands provides an adequate basis for a legal judgment that adjacent wetlands
may be defined as waters under the Act.").
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Corps, which is responsible for enforcement of the CWA, expansively
interpreted its jurisdiction over wetlands and other non-navigable waters.13
However, in SWANCC, 14 decided sixteen years later, the Court
narrowed the outer limits of the CWA's coverage. The Court in SWANCC
held that an isolated sand pit, not adjacent to any navigable water or to any
connecting tributary, was outside the jurisdictional grant of the CWA.'5
While the SWANCC majority did not specifically address jurisdiction over
wetlands, it did state in dicta that it was the "significant nexus" between the
wetland at issue in Riverside Bayview and a nearby navigable water that
permitted the federal government to regulate that wetland. 6
After SWANCC, the extent to which the Supreme Court had narrowed
the CWA's jurisdictional grant was unclear. The Fifth Circuit construed
SWANCC broadly, holding that the Supreme Court's decision restricted not
only regulation of isolated bodies with little connection to navigable
waters, but also tributaries that were not directly adjacent to navigable
waters. 7 However, most other circuits construed SWANCC more narrowly,
refusing to extend its holding beyond the types of isolated bodies at issue in
the case. 8 Despite this'ambiguity, the Corps did not alter its regulations
after SWANCC and continued to exercise broad regulatory powers due to
the ambiguity of the term "significant nexus"' 9 and a widespread belief that
SWANCC was a narrow ruling that should not be extended beyond its
facts.20
13. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at , 126 S. Ct. at 2216-17 (Scalia, J., plurality) ("Following our
decision in Riverside Bayview, the Corps adopted increasingly broad interpretations of its own
regulations under the Act.").
14. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
15. Id. at 174. Specifically, the Court invalidated the "Migratory Bird Rule," a Corps
regulation construing the CWA to permit federal regulation of water bodies-like the sand pit in
SWANCC-connected to a navigable water only by the flight patterns of migratory birds. Id.
16. Id. at 167 ("It was the significant nexus between the wetlands and 'navigable waters' that
informed our reading of the CWA in Riverside Bayview Homes.").
17. In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340, 345-46 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding after SWANCC that the
CWA is "not so broad as to permit the federal government to impose regulations over 'tributaries'
that are neither themselves navigable nor truly adjacent to navigable waters"); Rice v. Harken
Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264, 268-69 (5th Cir. 2001).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Hubenka, 438 F.3d 1026, 1034 (10th Cir. 2006); United States
v. Johnson, 437 F.3d 157, 170 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 412 F.3d
804, 807-08 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447, 453 (6th Cir. 2003)
(holding that SWANCC "did not ... [restrict] the [CWA] to only wetlands directly abutting
navigable water. Instead, the [SWANCCI Court, in a narrow holding, invalidated the Migratory
Bird Rule as exceeding the authority granted" to the Corps by the CWA.); United States v.
Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 712 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that a Corps regulation extending jurisdiction
to all tributaries of navigable waters, including relatively distant roadside ditches, was a
"reasonable interpretation" of the CWA).
19. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 at -, 126 S. Ct. at 2217.
20. Id. at -, 126 S. Ct. at 2256 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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In Rapanos, the Court attempted to resolve some of SWANCC's
ambiguity by addressing the question, specifically reserved in Riverside
Bayview,2" of whether non-adjacent wetlands were covered by the CWA.22
The petitioners in the case were appealing fines levied against them by the
Corps for backfilling wetlands on their property without a permit.2 3 In a
companion case decided in the same opinion, another set of petitioners was
suing the Corps for denying them a permit to deposit fill material in a
wetland on their property. 4 None of these wetlands were directly adjacent
to a navigable water, but all were adjacent to non-navigable waters that
connected to navigable waters.25 Thus, the wetlands in question were not
so closely intertwined with navigable waters as to make the boundary
between the two "inherently ambiguous"2 6 as in Riverside, nor, on the other
extreme, "unconnected to other waters" 27 as in SWANCC. This raised a
novel question for the Court as to whether wetlands that were nonadjacent,
yet hydrologically connected to navigable waters, were covered by the
CWA's jurisdictional grant.2 8
A plurality of four Justices found that the Corps may have exceeded
their jurisdiction in both cases and remanded it. 9 Their analysis mostly
focused on the definition of the term "navigable waters," vaguely defined
The plurality
in the CWA as "the waters of the United States."3
determined that this definition included only those "relatively permanent,
standing or continuously flowing bodies of water 'forming geographic
features' that are described in ordinary parlance as 'streams[,] ... oceans,

rivers, [and] lakes,' " stating that this was the common, everyday use of the
term and the only one that Congress could have intended." In the case of
wetlands, the plurality would have limited the Corps's jurisdiction to those
wetlands which are directly adjacent to a water of the United States and
have a "continuous surface connection" with the water in question,
"making it difficult to determine where the 'water' ends and the 'wetland'

21. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131-32 (1985).
22. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at , 126 S. Ct at 2219 (Scalia, J., plurality).
126 S. Ct. at 2219.
23. Id. at,
24. Id. at
126S. Ct. at2219.
25. Three of the wetland sites were connected to navigable-in-fact waters by man-made
ditches, and one was connected by a non-navigable river. Id.
26. Id. at , 126 S. Ct. at 2226.
27. Id. at , 126 S. Ct. at 2240.
28. Id. at __ 126 S. Ct. at 2236.
29. Id. at __ 126 S. Ct. at 2235.
30. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
31. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at __ 126 S. Ct. at 2225 (Scalia, J., plurality) (alteration in original)
(quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2882 (2d ed. 1954)).
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begins."32 The plurality directed the lower court on
remand to determine
33
whether the petitioners' wetlands met this standard.
Justice Kennedy wrote a lone concurrence, agreeing that the case
should be remanded because the Corps may have exceeded its powers but
disagreeing with the rule proposed by the plurality.34 He found instead that
a wetland is covered under the CWA if it forms a significant nexus with a
navigable water, 35 adopting the term used in SWANCC to describe the
holding of Riverside.36 Elaborating on this standard, Justice Kennedy
found that, because the stated purpose of the CWA was to "maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters,"37 a
significant nexus exists between a wetland and a navigable water when the
wetland "significantly affects the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity" of the navigable water.38 Conversely, a wetland does not form a
32. Id. at , 126 S. Ct. at 2227.
33. Id. at,
126 S. Ct. at 2235.
34. Id. at __ 126 S. Ct. at 2236 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
35. Id. at __ 126 S. Ct. at 2236 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
36. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. Army Corps of Eng'rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S.
159, 167 (2001) ("It was the significant nexus between the wetlands and 'navigable waters' that
informed our reading of the CWA in Riverside Bayview Homes.").
37. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at __ 126 S. Ct. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting 33
U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000)).
38. Id. at __ 126 S. Ct. at 2248. The merit of the significant nexus standard is debatable, as
is clear from the divided Rapanos decision. While the focus of this Recent Development is
primarily on how to implement the "significant nexus" standard, it is worth noting that there is
much discussion over whether the significant nexus test is the appropriate test for implementing
the CWA's jurisdictional requirements. One common criticism of the test is the lack of a brightline rule to guide landowners. See, e.g., Taylor Romigh, The Bright Line of Rapanos: Analyzing
the Plurality's Two-Part Test, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3295, 3306-07 (2007). Certainly, the factheavy nature of the significant nexus test does not on its own offer much guidance to landowners
as to whether they should expend time and money applying for a filling permit. As a result, some
have suggested that the plurality's approach should be adopted because it would "provide more
notice to potentially affected landowners." Id. at 3307. But, the fact that a rule is not easy to
apply does not make it an incorrect application of the law. In fact, the drafters of the CWA
intended its jurisdictional provisions to be a "congressional punt," Jamison E. Colburn, Waters of
the United States: Theory, Practice,and Integrity at the Supreme Court, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
183, 193 (2007), as evidenced by the vague definition of "navigable waters" as "Waters of the
United States," 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000 & Supp. 2005). Therefore, a fact-heavy, case-by-case
approach better aligns with congressional intent. Additionally, as the significant nexus test
becomes settled law (ideally with the help of a more decisive Supreme Court endorsement), more
precise rules will emerge through precedent that will guide landowners.
Some commentators have also lamented Justice Kennedy's inclusion of ecological
effects as a primary factor in the test, rather than restricting it to physical effects, noting that
ecological considerations "place[] a much heavier burden on the Corps and lower courts to
examine complex biological relationships." Bradford C. Mank, Implementing Rapanos-Will
Justice Kennedy's Significant Nexus Test Provide a Workable Standard for Lower Courts,
Regulators, and Developers?, 40 IND. L. REV. 291, 294 (2007). However, judicial rules must be
designed to reflect the laws they implement, and that principle cannot be abandoned simply to
ease the burden of proof. The CWA's purpose--"maintain[ing] the chemical, physical, and
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significant nexus with a navigable water when it either does not affect a
navigable water or its effect on navigable water is speculative or
insubstantial. 9 Under this interpretation of the CWA, if a wetland directly
abuts a navigable water, it is reasonable for the Corps to infer that a
significant nexus exists." On the other hand, if a wetland does not abut a
navigable water, the government may still exercise jurisdiction if it can
present evidence that is neither speculative nor insubstantial that a
significant nexus exists between the wetland and the navigable water.4
The standards set forth in Justice Kennedy's concurrence and the
plurality should both be used in the lower courts to find that the Corps has
jurisdiction over wetlands, but Justice Kennedy's opinion is broader than
the plurality's, so it will usually suffice on its own. Under the analysis laid
out by the Supreme Court in Marks v. United States,42 where there was no
majority opinion, the narrowest holding that can gain the support of a
majority of Justices is binding on lower courts. 3 Because Justice
Kennedy's opinion is the only holding that could be supported by at least
five Justices-Justice Kennedy and the four Justices who dissented-the
Kennedy concurrence is binding.' The dissent by Justice Stevens, joined
by three other Justices, would have upheld broad deference to the Corps's
judgment on what constitutes "waters of the United States" under Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.45 as applied by
biological integrity of the Nation's waters"-is stated too clearly in the statutory definitions to be
construed to only allow consideration of physical proximity. 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a) (2000).
39. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at __ 126 S.Ct. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
40. Adjacency to "certain major tributaries" may also permit an inference of a significant
nexus, but, according to Justice Kennedy, the Corps and EPA would have to clearly categorize
these in new regulations. Id.
41. Id.
42. 430 U.S. 188, 193-94 (1977). Marks addressed the standard for drawing the line
between protected expression and unprotected obscenity. It held that a prior case with no
majority opinion, Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), superseded the previous case
to control on the subject, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), despite the lack of a
majority. The court reasoned that, of the plurality and concurring opinions in Memoirs, the
plurality opinion-stating that expressive material is constitutionally protected unless it is "utterly
without social value," Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418-was the narrowest grounds upon which a
majority of Justices could agree, and controlled in the instant case.
43. Id.; see also GUIDANCE, supra note 9, at 2-3.
44. See United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724 (7th Cir. 2006) ("When a
majority of the Supreme Court agrees only on the outcome of a case and not on the ground for
that outcome, lower-court judges are to follow the narrowest ground to which a majority of the
Justices would have assented if forced to choose. In Rapanos, that is Justice Kennedy's ground."
(citation omitted)); N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 457 F.3d 1023, 1029 (9th Cir.
2006); ("Justice Kennedy's concurrence, constituting the fifth vote for reversal, concurred only in
the judgment and, therefore, provides the controlling rule of law.").
45. 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1985). Chevron was important to the Rapanos decision but is
beyond the scope of this Recent Development. Chevron held that the activities of an agency
charged with a duty by federal statute are entitled to considerable deference in their interpretation
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Riverside Bayview,46 but it also explicitly states that it would prefer Justice
Kennedy's standard to the plurality's narrower bright-line rule.47
Additionally, if situations arise where the plurality's bright-line rule
would permit federal jurisdiction, but the Kennedy concurrence would not,
courts should permit regulation under the plurality's standard. Justice
Stevens anticipated this possibility in his dissent when he stated that the
Corps should have jurisdiction in these situations.4 This approach is
logical, as five Justices would uphold jurisdiction under Justice Kennedy's
test, but at least eight Justices would uphold jurisdiction under the
plurality's test.49 Some courts have already signaled their intent to follow
Justice Stevens's instruction, citing prior appellate courts that have applied
this variation of the Marks rule to other split Supreme Court decisions.5 °
In June 2007, one year after Rapanos, the Corps and the EPA jointly
released a guidance, addressed to EPA regions and Corps districts, on how
to adapt CWA regulation practices to the Rapanos and SWANCC
The Guidance divided the nation's waters into three
standards."
(1)
waters over which the Corps should always assert
categories:
jurisdiction, (2) waters over which the Corps "generally will not assert
jurisdiction," and (3) waters over which a fact-specific analysis will be
conducted using the significant nexus test.5 2 Waters falling into the first
of that statute. Their interpretation should not be overruled by the courts unless (1) Congress has
expressed a "clear intent" that contradicts the agency's interpretation, or (2) the agency's
interpretation is not "based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id. A large part of the
disagreement between the plurality opinion and Kennedy's dissent in Rapanos was due to
whether the statutory language of the CWA extending jurisdiction only to "waters of the United
States," 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000 & Supp. 2005) (" 'navigable waters' means the waters of the
United States, including the territorial seas"), expressed a clear congressional intent to limit

regulation to "bodies forming geographical features such as oceans, rivers, and lakes," Rapanos,
547 U.S. at -, 126 S. Ct. at 2222 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(brackets omitted) (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2882 (2d ed. 1954)),
as stated by the plurality, or whether the fact that other definitions exist for "waters" besides the
one set forth by the plurality, id. at _, S. Ct. at 2243 (Kennedy, J., concurring), as well as for
"streams," id., require that the Court defer, per Chevron, to the Corps's reasonable interpretation.
46. 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985).
47. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at -, 126 S. Ct. at 2252 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at -, 126 S. Ct. at 2265-66 n. 14.
49. United States v. Bailey, 516 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1005 (D. Minn. 2007) ("[I1f the plurality
would find CWA jurisdiction over a particular wetland, so would the four dissenters, meaning
that at least eight justices would deem jurisdiction to exist.").
50. See United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 64-65 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v.
Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1157 (9th Cir. 2006); Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176,
1182 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. AT&T Bell Labs., 842
F.2d 1436, 1451 (3d Cir. 1988). But see King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 782-83 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(holding that the appellate court is "not free to combine a dissent with a concurrence to form a
Marks majority").
51. GUIDANCE, supra note 9, at 1.
52. Id.
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category-those that would always be regulated-are those falling under
the Rapanos plurality's bright-line rule, including "[t]raditional navigable
waters[,] [w]etlands adjacent to traditional navigable waters[,] [n]onnavigable tributaries of traditional navigable waters that are relatively
permanent" and have at least a continuous seasonal flow of water, and
"[w]etlands that directly abut such tributaries."53 The Corps would not
exert jurisdiction over those waters similar to the fact pattern set out in
SWANCC,54 such as "swales or erosional features," and "ditches
draining only uplands" and with no permanent flow of water.5
Finally, the Guidance lists circumstances in which a fact-based
significant nexus test will be applied. These include "[n]on-navigable
tributaries that are not relatively permanent[;] [w]etlands adjacent to nonnavigable tributaries that are not relatively permanent[;] [and] [w]etlands
directly adjacent to, but 56that do not directly abut, a relatively permanent
non-navigable tributary.
But to what extent do Rapanos and the Guidance actually affect the
Corps's ability to regulate wetlands under the CWA? Prior to Rapanos, the
Corps exercised broad jurisdiction over wetlands. 57 Even relatively remote
hydrological connections to navigable waters met the jurisdictional
requirements of the CWA, such as connections through
"intermittent ...streams and manmade ditches ... a roadside ditch
whose water took a winding, thirty-two-mile path to the Chesapeake
Bay, irrigation ditches and drains that intermittently connect to
covered waters, and ... the washes and arroyos of an arid
development site, located in the middle of the desert, through which
water courses ...during periods of heavy rain[." 5 8
Under the plurality's standard alone, it is unlikely that any of these areas
would be covered under the CWA.59 The plurality's rule is clear: a
wetland cannot be a navigable water, so in order to be regulated it must
physically abut a traditional navigable water in a way that makes it difficult
53. Id.
54. SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001).
55. GUIDANCE, supra note 9, at 1.
56. Id.
57. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S .... 126 S.Ct. 2208, 2217-18 (2006).
58. Id. at -, 126 S. Ct. at 2217-18 (fourth alteration in the original) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Treacy v. Newdunn Assoc., 344 F.3d 407, 410 (4th
Cir. 2003); United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 702 (4th Cir. 2003); Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v.
Flowers, 408 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2005)) (citing Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of Env't v.
Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d 943, 954-55 (9th Cir. 2002); Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation
Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 534 (9th Cir. 2001)).
59. Id. at -, 126 S. Ct. at 2218 (categorizing current Corps regulations as excessively
broad).
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to determine where the wetland begins and the navigable water ends.60
Since the Corps's pre-Rapanos regulations extended jurisdiction well
beyond wetlands that abut traditionally navigable waters,6' the plurality's
approach would severely restrict the Corps's pre-Rapanos activities.
But Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test allows for a more flexible
interpretation. The test can easily be construed by courts to barely limit the
CWA's jurisdictional grant at all and as mostly affecting the evidentiary
and procedural requirements for establishing jurisdiction over wetlands.
For example, a wetland connected to a navigable water only through "an
intermittent stream ' 62 would not be covered under the plurality's standard,63
but would have been covered under the Corps's regulations prior to
Rapanos, and could still be covered after Rapanos under the significant
nexus test. The federal government must only present evidence that the
wetland significantly affects the chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of the navigable water to which it is connected, even if the connection is
intermittent.
What Rapanos does inhibit is the Corps's practice of inferring a
substantial effect on navigable waters based on a "mere hydrological
connection,"' without presenting evidence of an actual effect. After
Rapanos, only if the wetland directly abuts a navigable water may a
substantial effect be inferred.65 If the wetland is not abutting a navigable
water-even if it is abutting a non-navigable water that connects to a
navigable water-the Corps must present evidence on a case-by-case basis
that the particular wetland in fact substantially affects the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of a navigable water.
If this type of direct evidence were hard to come by, the new standard
could significantly impede the Corps's ability to regulate the wetlands over
which it has claimed jurisdiction in the past. But many hydrologists and
other experts indicate that the evidence supporting such a connection is
abundant in most cases. After Rapanos, Environmental Defense,66 a
60. Id. at __,126 S. Ct. at 2227.
61. Id. at,
126 S. Ct. at 2217-18.
62. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at _, 126 S. Ct. at 2218 (internal quotation marks omitted).
63. Id. at , 126 S.Ct at 2225.
64. Id.
65. Id. at__, 126 S. Ct. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
66. Environmental Defense describes itself as linking "science, economics and law to create
innovative, equitable and cost-effective solutions to society's most urgent environmental
problems." Environmental Defense, Mission Statement-About Us, http://www.edf.org/page.
cfm?taglD=370 (last visited Mar. 10, 2008). Its past work includes a well-publicized 1974 study
of the Mississippi River that found high levels of carcinogens, see Harold M. Schmeck, Jr., Water
from MississippiRiver Linked to Cancer Death Trends, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1974, at 29, which
contributed to the passage of the Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660
(1974) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 349 (2000); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-25 (2000)),
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nonprofit environmental think tank, stated that "[tihe proof [of a significant
nexus between wetlands and navigable waters] is there, and when it is
67
presented ... the reach of the [CWA] will change very little.
Additionally, an amicus curiae brief submitted for Rapanos, presented by
the Association of State Wetland Managers, the Association of State
Floodplain Managers, and the New England Interstate Water Pollution
Control Commission, presents evidence that the "headwaters of a
watershed," including wetlands,68 substantially affect the navigable water to
which they are connected because they "collect water, sediment, energy,
and chemicals from the surrounding landscape and deliver them to the
larger [water bodies]," with functions including "regulation of sediment
export, retention of nutrients, maintenance of water quality characteristics,
processing of terrestrial organic matter, and maintenance of natural
discharge patterns.

69

While this evidentiary burden may draw out

enforcement proceedings, the Corps should still be able to prove a
significant nexus in most cases where there is a hydrological connection
between the wetland and the navigable water.
In practice, post-Rapanos litigation has shown that it is quite easy to
prove the existence of a significant nexus between navigable-in-fact waters
and wetlands. First, in the most straightforward cases where wetlands are
adjacent to navigable waters, courts have heeded Justice Kennedy's
instruction that a significant nexus should be inferred ° and have found one
to exist as a matter of law. 7 Finding a significant nexus for nonadjacent
wetlands has also proved fairly easy, if more time consuming. In United
States v. Cundiff,7 2 the United States District Court for the Western District
of Kentucky found a significant nexus between wetlands that were adjacent
to non-navigable tributaries of a navigable-in-fact water-the Green River
in Kentucky-despite the fact that the wetlands were physically remote
from the Green River. 73 The decision was largely based on the testimony
of experts who were able to provide a long list of ways in which the remote
wetlands significantly affected the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the navigable-in-fact water, thus meeting the significant nexus

and lobbying regulators to phase out lead from gasoline, Environmental Groups Fight Leaded
Gas Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1982, at A15.
67. Charles Lane, Justices Rein In Clean WaterAct, WASH. POST, June 20, 2006, at Al.
68. The brief describes headwaters as "first and second order streams, ditches, and
wetlands." Brief of Ass'n of State Wetland Managers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 15, Rapanos, 547 U.S. _, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (Nos. 04-1034 and 04-1384).
69. Id. at 15-16.
70. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at , 126 S. Ct. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 516 F. Supp. 2d 998 (D. Minn. 2007).
72. 480 F. Supp. 2d 940 (W.D. Ky. 2007).
73. Id. at 945.

1042

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

standard. Some of the relatively tenuous wetland functions that lead to a
finding of a significant nexus included providing water storage, acid mine
drainage and filtration, and a habitat for plants and wildlife, all of which
affected water storage capacity, downstream flooding, and increasing
"flood peaks in the Green River, and, in turn, "impact[ing] navigation, crop
production in bottomlands, downstream bank erosion and sedimentation. 74
Additionally, the wetlands filtered sediment which affected the water
quality of the Green River," impacting navigation and "aquatic food
webs."75 Thus, even for a wetland relatively remote from a navigable-infact water, the court found numerous reasons why a significant nexus
existed between the two geographical bodies.76
Additionally, in a Ninth Circuit case decided in 2007, Northern
CaliforniaRiver Watch v. City of Healdsburg,77 the court found that even a
groundwater connection between a wetland and a navigable water may be
enough to form a significant nexus. The court held that evidence of an
underground hydrological connection to a navigable water was relevant to
a finding of a significant nexus.78 This type of connection will be critical in
many similar cases, as groundwater is present in small quantities almost
everywhere.7 9 Northern CaliforniaRiver Watch also noted the importance
of the activities of wildlife in finding a significant nexus. The court found
that the species of birds and fish found in the wetland in question and its
associated non-navigable pond "commingled with" and were
"indistinguishable from" the nearby navigable-in-fact water.8" Finally, the
court considered the effect of the actual dumping which was an important
factor in finding a significant nexus. The city of Healdsburg had been
dumping sewage into the non-navigable body in question. 81 The court cited
testimony from trial that this dumping was itself causing the non-navigable
water to significantly affect the chemical integrity of the navigable water
by increasing chloride levels. 82

74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. The Cundiff court also found that the wetland in question met the Rapanos
plurality's standard, since the connecting tributaries were relatively permanent bodies of water
connected to a navigable-in-fact water, and the boundary between the wetland and the tributaries
was difficult to discern. Id. at 946-47.
77. 496 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2007).
78. Id. at 1000-01.
79. THE GROUNDWATER FOUNDATION, GROUNDWATER BASICS 2 (2007), available at
http://www.groundwater.org/gi/docs/GWBASICS2.pdf.
80. N. Cal. River Watch, 496 F.3d at 1001.
81. Id.
82. Id. The use of the property owner's polluting acts not only to make a substantive case
against the polluter, but also to establish jurisdiction, has important implications for extending
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Thus, the few cases that apply Rapanos indicate that there are many
ways to prove that wetlands significantly affect the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of non-adjacent navigable waters. Therefore, the only
fundamental change in Corps policy after Rapanos is that the Corps must
accommodate the need for case-by-case proof of a significant nexus, and
the practical consequences of Rapanos are minimal.
This is not to say that the Corps will be able to extend its jurisdiction
to everything that it has in the past under the significant nexus test. For
example, United States v. Hubenka,83 a Tenth Circuit case handed down
after SWANCC but prior to Rapanos, involved the discharge of pollutants
into a non-navigable river that had a remote hydrological connection to a
navigable river." Despite its best efforts, the federal government could not
prove that the non-navigable river had any effect on the navigable river.85
Yet the Tenth Circuit concluded that the "potential for pollutants to migrate
from a tributary to navigable waters downstream" permitted an inference of
a " 'significant nexus' between those waters."86 Hubenka exemplifies the
rare situation where the new evidentiary burden on the government will
prevent jurisdiction over a non-navigable water. The inference that the
Court made in Hubenka-deferring to the Corps's judgment that the
potential for the non-navigable river to substantially affect the navigable
water-would not be allowed in a post-Rapanos court.87 The Corps would
instead have to conduct an investigation of the specific water in question
and present findings of an actual effect to the court. If it could not do so, as
was the case in Hubenka,88 then the Corps could not exercise jurisdiction
over the wetland.
However, even where evidence of a significant nexus is inadequate,
the Corps may use an alternative approach to establish jurisdiction. As
noted above, in Northern CaliforniaRiver Watch the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals used not only evidence unrelated to the case, such as physical
proximity and ecological commingling, to find a significant nexus, but also
the effect caused by the very actfor which the landowner was being suedspecifically, depositing sewage into the pond and wetland, leading to
higher chloride levels in the nearby navigable-in-fact water.89 The
jurisdiction even where the effect of a wetland on the chemical, physical, or biological integrity of
a navigable water is not "significant." See infra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
83. 438 F.3d 1026 (10th Cir. 2006).
84. Id. at 1029-30.
85. Id. at 1035.
86. Id. at 1034.
87. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S ....
126 S. Ct. 2208, 2248-49 (2006) (Kennedy,

J., concurring).
88. Hubenka, 438 F.3d at 1030-36.
89. N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 1001 (9th Cir. 2007).
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Northern CaliforniaRiver Watch court found the effect of the sewage to be
significant. However, where a court finds that the actions of the wetland
owner have some effect on a navigable water, but finds that it is not
significant, the Corps should still be able to exert control over the wetland,
.and, as a result, maintain jurisdiction over most wetlands that otherwise
might be out of reach after Rapanos.
The Rapanos plurality notes, in dicta, that the actual addition of
pollutants into a navigable water from a hydrologically connected source is
prohibited by the CWA under 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).9" In doing so, the
plurality-perhaps inadvertently-suggested an alternate avenue for the
exercise of broad federal jurisdiction over privately owned wetlands. The
language of § 1311(a) indicates that it does not matter from where or in
what manner someone adds a pollutant to a navigable water, nor does the
statutory language require that the amount be significant, 9 as would be
required by the Rapanos test.92 The only issue is whether "any" pollutant
was added to a navigable water.93 As noted above,94 evidence has shown
that wetlands filter out pollutants and act as a barrier between pollutants
and navigable waters. 95 It follows that the destruction of wetlands that
serve this function would lead to more pollutants entering navigable waters
in many cases. Even if the exposure of pollutants to the water is not
"significant," the result should establish the Corps's regulatory jurisdiction,
because § 1311(a) prohibits the "discharge of any pollutant,"9 6 not just
significant pollutants. Therefore, courts should allow the Corps to exercise
jurisdiction over wetlands if there is evidence presented that their

90. Rapanos, 547 U.S___
126 S. Ct. 2208, 2227 (2006) (Scalia, J., plurality) (quoting 33
U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A) (2000 & Supp. 2005); 33 U.S.C. § 131 ](a) (2000)).
91. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000). Section 1311(a) should be enforced against both active
polluters and those who permissively allow pollution to occur by destroying wetlands on their
property. An analogy illustrates why such enforcement is reasonable. A wetland may prevent
pollutants from entering navigable waters. Similarly, a levee may protect a town from dangerous
flooding. Yet if a person destroys the levee-even if she owns it-and the town floods, she
would still be held responsible for the damage, even though she did not actively flood the town.
Similarly, one who destroys a wetland and permissively allows pollutants to enter a navigable
water should be liable under § 1311 (a).
92. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at , 126 S.Ct. at 2248.
93. The statutory language states: "Except as in compliance with this section and sections
302, 306, 307, 318, 402, and 404 of this Act, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be
unlawful." § 1311 (a).
94. See supra text accompanying note 69.
95. Brief of Ass'n of State Wetland Managers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent,
supra note 68, at 15.
96. § 1311(a) (emphasis added).
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destruction, alteration, or filling would lead to even a small amount of
pollutant97 entering navigable water.
This section should also be construed to allow the government to take
preventive measures to regulate wetlands, and not just to punish polluters
after the fact. While the statute most expressly addresses those who have
already violated the statute,98 nothing in the wording forbids the
government from taking preventive action to avoid pollutants entering
navigable waters, and the Court's practice of deferring to the Corps's
interpretation to meet the goals of the CWA under Chevron99 should permit
the Corps's use of this construction. Even if the courts are unwilling to
permit before-the-fact preventive measures under § 1311(a), the Corps can
still significantly control wetlands under the statute by giving notice to
landowners planning to fill their wetlands that such an act could result in
pollution to navigable waters and subsequent liability under the CWA,
deterring landowners from going through with the destruction.
Ultimately, courts should construe Rapanos and the Guidance as
simply requiring the case-by-case production of evidence that the wetland
at issue significantly affects the chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of a navigable water. This evidence is proving to be abundant, thus
permitting the Corps to continue to exercise broad jurisdiction over the
nation's wetlands. The change instigated by Rapanos is mostly procedural,
requiring a case-by-case analysis, instead of allowing an inference of a
significant nexus, and is not a reinterpretation of the CWA's substance.
Additionally, courts should allow the Corps to exercise jurisdiction where
there is evidence presented that the destruction, alteration, or filling of
wetlands would cause any pollutants to enter navigable waters. The stated
purposes of the CWA, which include the restoration of the nation's
waters 00 and a national goal of eliminating all discharge of pollutants into
navigable waters,'0 ' support this broad interpretation. 0 2 Therefore,
97. Pollutant is defined broadly by the CWA to include "dredged spoil, solid waste,
incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological
materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and
industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into the water." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6)
(2000 & Supp. 2005).
98. The statute forbids the "addition of any pollutant to navigable waters." Rapanos, 547
U.S. at __ 126 S. Ct. at 2227 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A) (2000 &
Supp. 2005)).
99. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
100. 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a) (2000).
101. § 1251(a)(1). This clause specifically states a goal of eliminating the discharge of
pollutants into navigable waters by 1985, a goal that was obviously not attained (otherwise the
jurisdictional reach of the CWA in 2007 would have been a moot point). However, the failure of
the nation to achieve this goal on time should not diminish the effect of the intent and spirit of
this stated purpose on enforcement of the Act.
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Rapanos has not substantively altered the scope of the CWA. The current
confusion"°3 about how the courts should approach wetland regulation
under the CWA can be remedied if the courts continue to allow the Corps
broad discretion to interpret the CWA, but take a more active role in
analyzing whether the federal government has proved an actual-not
inferred-significant nexus between the wetland in question and a
navigable water, and liberally permit a significant nexus to be found.
SAMUEL

P. BIcKETT

102. Granted, the CWA also states as a purpose the recognition of the "primary
responsibilities and rights of States" to prevent pollution. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b). However, the
fact that this purpose comes after the purpose of restoring the Nation's waters suggest that it
should be given secondary importance. Also, the states' rights purpose statement specifically
lists ways in which the states' rights will be preserved, thus indicating that, since supremacy of
jurisdiction over wetlands and related bodies of non-navigable-in-fact waters is not listed, the
states were not intended to be granted primacy in this area. Id.
103. See, e.g., Lane, supra note 6.

